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Abstract 
The growing number of dual-income families with young children and ageing parents has led to a 
corresponding increase in the number of accommodation requests relating to childcare and eldercare. 
Determining whether an employer’s denial of such a request constitutes prima facie discrimination on the 
basis of family status has bedeviled adjudicators, resulting in various “tests” being enunciated across 
Canada. While some scholars and adjudicators have suggested that these “tests” are inconsistent with 
the test set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in Moore v. British Columbia and place a uniquely high 
burden on claimants to establish prima facie discrimination, the authors suggest that is not necessarily 
correct. The existing tests for family status discrimination can be reconciled with the Moore test, through 
an acknowledgment that they simply inform the necessary analysis to consider at the third stage of the 
Moore test. All of these tests recognize that there is always a conflict between spending time with family 
members and spending time at work, which therefore requires a more nuanced approach to determine 
whether the third stage of the Moore test is met. The authors propose that these tests boil down to a 
simple question or issue—whether a claimant has the “meaningful choice,” or is “reasonably able,” to 
comply with both family and work obligations, given the claimant’s unique circumstances and workplace 
obligations. Finally, the authors argue that the common objections to considering this issue do not 
provide persuasive reasons for departing from the overall adjudicative consensus. 
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The growing number of dual-income families with young children and ageing parents has led 
to a corresponding increase in the number of accommodation requests relating to childcare 
and eldercare. Determining whether an employer’s denial of such a request constitutes 
prima facie discrimination on the basis of family status has bedeviled adjudicators, resulting 
in various “tests” being enunciated across Canada. While some scholars and adjudicators 
have suggested that these “tests” are inconsistent with the test set out by the Supreme Court 
of Canada in Moore v. British Columbia and place a uniquely high burden on claimants to 
establish prima facie discrimination, the authors suggest that is not necessarily correct. The 
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VIPOND, OLIPHANT, FAMILY STATUS DISCRIMINATION 565 
existing tests for family status discrimination can be reconciled with the Moore test, through 
an acknowledgment that they simply inform the necessary analysis to consider at the third 
stage of the Moore test. All of these tests recognize that there is always a conflict between 
spending time with family members and spending time at work, which therefore requires 
a more nuanced approach to determine whether the third stage of the Moore test is met. 
The authors propose that these tests boil down to a simple question or issue—whether a 
claimant has the “meaningful choice,” or is “reasonably able,” to comply with both family 
and work obligations, given the claimant’s unique circumstances and workplace obligations. 
Finally, the authors argue that the common objections to considering this issue do not provide 
persuasive reasons for departing from the overall adjudicative consensus. 
THE DYNAMICS OF THE CANADIAN WORKFORCE have changed dramatically over 
the last half-century. On the one hand, we have witnessed a two-fold increase in 
dual-income parents with children,1 and on the other, the greatest increase in the 
proportion of seniors since Confederation.2 Tis means that nearly all Canadians 
will provide care to a young child or ageing parent at some point in their working 
careers. Additionally, there is no longer the same vast unpaid workforce—the 
so-called “stay at home” mother—to shoulder these responsibilities.3 
Family-related duties and obligations, in particular caregiving responsibilities, 
are often complex, dynamic, and unpredictable, resulting in an inevitable 
confict between family and workplace obligations. Tis is especially true given 
that Canadians are currently working longer hours with greater workplace 
expectations.4 Tis confict has led to an increase in workplace accommodation 
1. From 1975 to 2015, the percentage of dual-income families with at least one child have 
increased from approximately 40 per cent to 70 per cent. See e.g. Statistics Canada, News 
Release, 11-630-X “Canadian Megatrends: Te Rise of the Dual-Earner Family with 
Children” (30 May 2016) at 1, online (pdf ): <www.statcan.gc.ca/daily-quotidien/160530/ 
dq160530c-eng.pdf> [perma.cc/8EP5-KZRW] [Statistics Canada, “Megatrends”]. 
2. A 2016 census shows that there are 5.9 million Canadian seniors compared to 5.8 million 
Canadians of 14 years old and younger. See Statistics Canada, News Release, 11-001-X, “Age 
and Sex, and Type of Dwelling Data: Key Results from the 2016 Census” (3 May 2016) at 3, 
online (pdf ): <www.statcan.gc.ca/daily-quotidien/170503/dq170503a-eng.pdf> [perma.cc/ 
UM9X-WVDH]. In 2015, 75 per cent of dual-income couples with children are reported to 
have two full-time working parents. See Statistics Canada, “Megatrends,” supra note 1.
3. Tere still exists a signifcant disparity in the distribution of caregiving responsibilities. See
e.g. Statistics Canada, Time Use: Total Work Burden, Unpaid Work, and Leisure, by Melissa 
Moyser & Amanda Burlock, in Women in Canada: A Gender-based Statistical Report, 
Catalogue No 89-503-X (Statistics Canada, 30 July 2018). See also Canadian Caregiver 
Coalition, “Beyond Recognition—Caregiving & Human Rights in Canada: A Policy Brief ” 
(March 2015) at 2, online (pdf ): Careers Canada <www.carerscanada.ca/wp-content/ 
uploads/2016/02/CCC_Policy_brief_Human_rights_EN.pdf> [perma.cc/8TDQ-VYGS]. 
4. Te average total weekly employment hours of Canadian couples has increased from an 
average of 57.6 hours in 1976 to 64.8 hours in 2008—this is a 13 per cent increase and 
almost the equivalent of an additional full day of paid work per week (7.2 hours). See 
Statistics Canada, Te family work week, by Katherine Marshall, in Perspectives on Labour and 
Income, Catalogue No 75-001-X (Statistics Canada, April 2009) at 6. 












requests,5 including requests for time of (both short-term and long-term), 
changes to work schedules (e.g., lesser hours or diferent work hours), changes 
to the location of work (e.g., working from home or at a closer location to 
home), and changes to the nature of the work itself (e.g., less travel or fewer 
obligations), among others.6 
In light of these increasingly frequent and inevitable conficts, many 
have urged employers and employees to collaborate in reaching a solution.7 
A cooperative, compassionate approach that forestalls the need for litigation is to 
be commended; and many conficts between family obligations and workplace 
requirements can and should be addressed in this way.8 Unfortunately, other 
conficts cannot, which makes it necessary for employers to examine whether 
there is a legal obligation to accommodate particular requests by employees, and 
for employees to determine when they are legally entitled to be accommodated. 
Such an obligation only exists if a prima facie discrimination case9 on the basis of 
family status is frst made out.10 
5. In British Columbia, the number of complaints based on family status increased from 
95 to 102 in the year 2014-2015 to 2015-2016. See BC Human Rights Tribunal, 
Annual Report 2014-2015 (BC Human Rights Tribunal, 2016) at 3; BC Human 
Rights Tribunal, Annual Report 2015-2016 (BC Human Rights Tribunal, 2017) at 3. 
Similarly, in Ontario, complaints based on family status increased from 10 per cent to 
13 per cent in the year 2012-2013 to 2013-2014. See “Social Justice Tribunals Ontario 
2012-13 Annual Report” online: Social Justice Tribunals Ontario <www.sjto.gov.on.ca/ 
documents/sjto/2012-13%20Annual%20Report.html> [perma.cc/8SZR-V8LW]; 
“Social Justice Tribunals Ontario 2013-14 Annual Report” online: Social Justice Tribunals 
Ontario <www.sjto.gov.on.ca/documents/sjto/2013-14%20Annual%20Report.html> 
[perma.cc/PMB3-RMVB]. 
6. See “Policy and guidelines on discrimination because of family status” online: Ontario 
Human Rights Commission <www.ohrc.on.ca/en/policy-and-guidelines-discrimination-
because-family-status/vi-duty-accommodate#fn36> [perma.cc/GBH4-LZRY]. 
7. Te former acting Chief Commissioner of the Canadian Human Rights Commission, 
David Langtry, has commented on this matter. See Canadian Human Rights Commission, 
Press Release, “CHRC Welcomes Court Rulings on Landmark Family Status Cases” (2 May 
2014), online: Cision <www.newswire.ca/news-releases/chrc-welcomes-court-rulings-on-
landmark-family-status-cases-514224451.html> [perma.cc/WS5D-PHJR]. See also Sheila 
Osborne-Brown, “Discrimination and Family Status: Te Test, the Continuing Debate, and 
the Accommodation Conversation” (2018) 14 JL & Equality 89. 
8. Flatt v Treasury Board (Department of Industry), 2014 PSLREB 2 at para 99 [Flatt], af’d Flatt 
v Canada (AG), 2015 FCA 250 [Flatt FCA]. 
9. Te prima facie discrimination case has also been referred to simply as the “complainant’s 
case.” See e.g. Vik v Finamore (No 2), 2018 BCHRT 9 at paras 48-50. 
10. “Family status” is a prohibited ground of discrimination under most Canadian human rights 
legislation, which encapsulates parent-child caregiving situations. However, the precise 
statutory defnitions vary.  Some jurisdictions, like Canada and British Columbia, do not 
defne the term family status, while others, such as Ontario, defne it as “the status of being 
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A clear consensus on what the prima facie “test” consists of in the context 
of family status discrimination claims has been elusive. Several adjudicators have 
observed that the law with respect to family status discrimination is “unsettled,”11 
and that “competing” views and approaches12 have developed across the country 
which has “resulted in inconsistency and uncertainty in the law”13 that “requires 
attention.”14 Tis ostensibly “fractious area of law”15 includes approaches at the 
federal human rights tribunal (stemming from the Brown and Hoyt 
decisions),16 in the federal courts (recently settled in Johnstone No. 2),17 
in British Columbia (in Campbell River),18 in Ontario (as set out in cases like 
Misetich),19 and in Alberta (stemming from the SMS Equipment case).20 Tese 
various standards have been shifting and unpredictable, having been applied 
diferently across jurisdictions, time periods, and adjudicators. In addition, 
arbitrators, human rights tribunals, and courts have critically engaged with 
the tests developed by one another in this area, sometimes with a degree of 
11. See e.g. Adair v Forensic Psychiatric Services Commission (No 2), 2017 BCHRT 147 at paras 
119-33 [Adair]; Suen v Envirocon Environmental Services (No 2), 2017 BCHRT 226 at para 
74 [Suen]; Misetich v Value Village Stores Inc, 2016 HRTO 1229 [Misetich]. 
12. SMS Equipment Inc v Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union, Local 707, 2015 
ABQB 162 at para 51 [SMS Equipment]; Suen, supra note 11 at paras 77-78; see generally 
Melody Jahanzadeh, “Family Status Accommodation: Te Road to an Amalgamated 
Approach” (2012) 2 Western J Leg Stud 1. 
13. Misetich, supra note 11 at para 44. 
14. Durikova v BC Ministry of Justice, 2018 BCHRT 258 at para 58 [Durikova]. 
15. United Nurses of Alberta v Alberta Health Services, 2019 ABQB 255 at para 52 
[United Nurses]. 
16. Hoyt v Canadian National Railway, 2006 CHRT 33 [Hoyt], af’g Brown v Canada 
(Department of National Revenue, Customs and Excise), 1993 CHRD 7 [Brown]. 
17. Te Johnstone case has gone through two iterations in the federal sphere. Te initial Johnstone 
decision of the Federal Court generally followed the Brown and Hoyt approach in overturning 
the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal. See Johnstone v Canada (AG), 2007 FC 36 at para 
29 [Johnstone No 1]. Te subsequent case proceeded through the tribunal and the federal 
courts, leading to a Federal Court of Appeal judgment which clarifed (or modifed) the Hoyt 
approach. See Canada (AG) v Johnstone, 2014 FCA 110 [Johnstone No 2]. 
18. Health Sciences Assoc of BC v Campbell River and North Island Transition Society, 2004 
BCCA 260 at paras 35-39 [Campbell River], af’d Envirocon Environmental Services, ULC v 
Suen, 2019 BCCA 46 [Suen BCCA]; Stuart v Navigata Communications Ltd, 2007 BCSC 
463 at para 79. 
19. Misetich, supra note 11 at para 42. Tis approach, which can be seen as a modifcation 
of the Johnstone No 2 approach, has not been universally followed in Ontario, with some 
adjudicators preferring the Johnstone No 2 approach unmodifed. See e.g. Ontario Public 
Service Employees Union (Bharti) v Ontario (Natural Resources and Forestry), 2015 CanLII 
19330 (ON GSB). Others have efectively applied both tests. See e.g. Peternel v Custom 
Granite & Marble Ltd, 2018 ONSC 3508 [Peternel]. 
20. See e.g. SMS Equipment, supra note 12 at para 51; United Nurses, supra note 15 
at paras 41-59. 










     
 
568 
overt criticism not often seen in other contexts. As a result of this confusion, 
some adjudicators have begun applying multiple tests in order to cover all 
possible bases.21 
Our primary objectives in this article are twofold: (1) to propose a solution 
that seeks to reconcile and encapsulate the various tests that have developed 
in this context, and respond to potential criticisms of this approach; and (2) 
to demonstrate that the proposed solution based on existing case law is not, 
as is often alleged, an outlier in the human rights code context, but rather is 
consistent with the analysis required in other comparable contexts at the prima 
facie stage, including in relation to religion, disability, and addictions. 
Regarding the frst objective, despite the diferent verbal formulations that 
have been applied as “tests” at the prima facie stage of family status claims, 
we suggest that there is a deep commonality in all of the approaches taken to date. 
In our view, all of these tests can be usefully seen to revolve around the question of 
whether the claimant has a “meaningful choice” or is “reasonably able” to comply 
with both family and workplace obligations given their unique circumstances.22 
On this approach, an employee making no efort to resolve a potential confict 
between workplace and family obligations (despite the presence of reasonable 
alternatives that would avoid the confict entirely), or making deliberate 
choices that in fact create an unnecessary confict with workplace obligations, 
is insufcient to demonstrate a need for accommodation in the frst place. 
We anticipate at least two important challenges to the approach we 
propose: (1) It overtly incorporates the controversial notion of “choice” in the 
discrimination analysis, which is normally a concept to be carefully avoided in 
the human rights code context; and (2) it requires the claimant to demonstrate 
“something more” at the prima facie stage, and in particular, to demonstrate that 
the claimant has attempted to “self-accommodate.” 
21. See e.g. Peternel, supra note 19, Sheard J (“Whether the Court follows the Misetich approach 
or applies the Johnstone factors, the outcome is the same: the plaintif has failed to show 
that Custom’s request that she begin her workday at 8:30 a.m. is discriminatory” at 74). See 
also Adair, supra note 11 at para 133; Durikova, supra note 14 at para 58; Edmonton (City) 
Police Service v Edmonton Police Assn (Coughlan Grievance), [2019] AGAA No 4 at paras 
121-23 (Arbitrator: DC Jones); Partridge v Botony Dental Corporation, 2015 ONCA 836 at 
para 20; Simpson v Pranajen Group Ltd o/a Nimigon Retirement Home, 2019 HRTO 10 at 
para 31; Tolko Industries Ltd v United Steelworkers, Local 1-417 (Anderson Grievance), [2018] 
BCCAAA No 95 at para 32 (Arbitrator: Corinn M Bell). 
22. It is the authors’ position that the proposed approach can be applied to all claims of adverse 
efects discrimination based on family status, not just caregiving cases, as the ultimate issue 
is the same. As discussed below, however, the proposed approach would not apply to direct 
discrimination claims, because the difculty of identifying the necessary “connection” 
between a claimant’s family status and a negative impact they sufer does not arise in the 
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With respect to the frst concern, we acknowledge that overtly incorporating 
any notion of “choice” in the context of human rights codes is bound to be 
controversial, given well-documented abuses of this concept in the past.23 On this 
basis, our alternative formulation—that the prima facie case must consider the 
“reasonable ability” of employees to avoid the asserted confict between workplace 
obligations and family life—may appear more palatable. However, the end result 
is the same: we propose an analysis that depends in part on whether claimants 
have reasonable options available to them that would allow them to fulfll both 
workplace and family obligations. 
To foreshadow our argument in response to this concern, we think it is 
helpful to draw a distinction between two types of situations in which the term 
“choice” could be used in the discrimination context. Te frst scenario involves 
“choices” that are essentially irrelevant to the discrimination analysis, such as the 
choice to become pregnant or have a family, the choice of whether and who to 
marry, or the choice to become sexually intimate with a partner of one’s choosing. 
While these situations may be described as involving “choices” on some level, 
they are so intertwined with an individual’s protected family status that they 
should be treated as an integral part of that identity, and hence “of limits” in the 
discrimination analysis, just like similarly fundamental or unavoidable “choices” 
are of limits in other discrimination cases.24 We will call these types of scenarios 
ones that involve a “problematic use” of the concept of “choice.” 
However, there are other situations in which a meaningful range of “choices” 
or “options” are available to an individual, which we suggest should be considered 
23. See e.g. Diana Majury, “Women Are Temselves to Blame: Choice as a Justifcation for 
Unequal Treatment” in Fay Faraday, Margaret Denike & M Kate Stephenson, eds, Making 
Equality Rights Real: Securing Substantive Equality under the Charter (Irwin Law, 2006) 209; 
Sonia Lawrence, “Choice, Equality and Tales of Racial Discrimination: Reading the Supreme 
Court on Section 15” in Sheila McIntyre & Sanda Rodgers, eds, Diminishing Returns: 
Inequality and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (LexisNexis Butterworths, 
2006) 115; Elizabeth Shilton, “‘Family Status’ Discrimination: New Tool for Transforming 
Workplaces, or Trojan Horse for Subverting Gender Equality?” (Queen’s University Legal 
Research Paper Series No 2015-049, 2013), online: <www.ssrn.com/abstract=2330294> 
[perma.cc/BN4J-C2WR] [Shilton, “Trojan Horse”]; Elizabeth Shilton, “Family Status 
Discrimination: ‘Disruption and Great Mischief ’ or Bridge over the Work–Family Divide?” 
(2018) 14 JL & Equality 33 at 54-56 [Shilton, “Work–Family Divide”]. 
24. For instance, it is inaccurate to the point of being ofensive to suggest that an individual has 
a “choice” as to their sexual orientation. And while individuals may have a “choice” in some
sense as to whether to be sexually active, that decision is so closely related to their identity 
that it amounts to no choice at all. See Law Society of British Columbia v Trinity Western 
University, 2018 SCC 33 at paras 96-97 [Trinity] (noting that it is not possible “to condemn 
a practice so central to the identity of a protected and vulnerable minority without thereby 
discriminating against its members and afronting their human dignity and personhood”). 
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in the prima facie stage of the analysis. Tese involve situations where a particular 
choice, although in some way connected to a protected ground of discrimination, 
is not central to an individual’s identity or protected characteristic. In the family 
status context, this may include choices, such as who should pick up or drop of 
one’s children at school, take them to appointments or extra-curricular activities, 
or leave work intermittently during the day to perform routine daily childcare 
obligations when other options are available. In these cases, the particular 
decision made by a claimant cannot necessarily be considered irrelevant to the 
discrimination analysis, because doing so would confer upon the employee the 
unilateral power to create a confict between workplace and personal obligations 
that may be reasonably avoided. We will call these types of choices ones that 
involve the “necessary use” of the concept of “choice.” 
Tis is not to say that every circumstance falling into this “necessary use” 
of choice category presents a meaningful choice between two genuine options, 
one conficting with workplace obligations and another not. Tat will depend on 
the specifc facts of a particular case. What constitutes a genuine and meaningful 
choice for some persons may be either unavailable or efectively coercive for 
others. For instance, the range of meaningful childcare options available to a 
wealthy couple with only one working parent will be signifcantly greater than 
for a single parent with limited disposable income. Te point of our proposed 
analysis is to create a meaningful standard that can be applied in all cases, 
subject to the unique circumstances of the claimant and the meaningful choices 
available to them. 
We think the second concern—i.e., that this approach places an additional 
burden on the claimant, or “something more,” beyond what they would otherwise 
need to establish—is also important to consider, but less persuasive than it appears 
at frst blush. Taken alone, the argument essentially assumes what it is attempting 
to prove, namely, the point at which a prima facie case of discrimination is made 
out in this context. Tat is, it assumes that every confict between workplace and 
family activities or obligations, even superfcial conficts that are easily avoidable 
or the sole result of choices by an employee (despite the presence of reasonable 
alternative options), constitutes discrimination on the basis of family status in the 
frst place. Similarly, the view that a consideration of at least some choices made 
by an employee constitutes a requirement of “self-accommodation” at the prima 
facie stage25 assumes the same thing: that the factual circumstances presented in 
25. Tis concern is raised throughout the case law and scholarship. See e.g. SMS Equipment,
supra note 12 at paras 54-67, 77; Lyle Kanee & Adam Cembrowski, “Family Status 
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all such cases constitutes prima facie discrimination in the frst place, such that 
requiring a claimant to undertake reasonable eforts to avoid a confict between 
work and family life is a form of “accommodation” that the claimant undertakes. 
If, instead, the standard is seen as necessary to establish a case of prima facie
discrimination in the frst place—that is, to establish a family-based need to be 
accommodated, rather than a preference26—suggesting that the standard requires 
“something more” or “self-accommodation” can be misleading. 
Tis brings us to our second objective in this article. We will attempt to show 
that, contrary to the criticisms of similar approaches adopted by adjudicators, 
our proposed solution is not unique to family status claims. Rather, we suggest it 
is supported by the analysis undertaken by adjudicators in other discrimination 
cases where the claimant has at least some meaningful control over his or her 
circumstances or decisions, and therefore the extent to which those circumstances 
or decisions present an actual confict with work-related obligations. 
In addition to family status context, similar problems can arise, for instance, 
in situations involving religion, disability, or addiction, because these scenarios 
can sometimes involve a range of reasonable options available to an employee, 
only some of which may confict with workplace obligations. As in the case 
of family status claims, however, the proper approach to these types of cases 
will avoid relying on an alleged “choice” that is really no choice at all (i.e., the 
“problematic use” scenarios), and will focus on the particular circumstances of 
the claimant to determine whether it in fact presents reasonable options to the 
claimant, some of which would avoid a workplace confict altogether (i.e., the 
“necessary use” scenarios). 
In sum, while other approaches to the prima facie case in this context can 
certainly be imagined, including by suggesting that every workplace obligation 
is prima facie discriminatory as long as it creates a potential confict with 
26. See Osborne-Brown, supra note 7 at 104. Osborne-Brown observes that: 
[w]hat both the court and the OHRT seem to have had in mind is the process of the employee 
determining whether they have a need for accommodation “consistent with their duties 
and obligations as a member of society,” a concept that, along with non-discrimination and 
accommodation of needs, is embedded in the purpose section of the CHRA. It is reasonable 
to say that an employee would not know whether she has a need until she knows whether she 
can solve the caregiving issue within her own family. If she can, she does not have a need. Te 
question of accommodation does not even arise. 














family obligations for anyone,27 focusing on the options reasonably available 
to individual employees, and whether those options reasonably allow them to 
fulfll both family and workplace obligations, is in our view both principled 
and consistent with the approach commonly employed in other human rights 
contexts that present scenarios involving similar types of choices. 
I. OVERVIEW OF PRIMA FACIE DISCRIMINATION 
A. THE MOORE TEST 
Much of the controversy in the area of family status stems from an alleged 
disconnect between the way the discrimination analysis proceeds in family status 
claims, particularly those involving caregiving responsibilities, as opposed to 
other grounds of discrimination, improperly creating a “hierarchy” of grounds 
of discrimination.28 Terefore, to put the discussion into context, we must start 
with a brief overview of frst principles that apply to all discrimination claims. 
Te approach to identifying substantive discrimination carried out in 
human rights legislation is well known. Te claimant must frst demonstrate 
prima facie discrimination, i.e., a case that “is complete and sufcient to justify 
a verdict” of discrimination in the absence of a response,29 only after which the 
burden falls to the respondent to justify its conduct according to the Meiorin 
analysis.30 Te difculty with the “complete and sufcient” prima facie case 
standard is that it does not explain what is complete and sufcient to justify a 
fnding of discrimination in the absence of an adequate defence or justifcation 
from a respondent. 
27. While it is not entirely clear to us, certain passages of Professor Shilton’s thoughtful work 
in this area may suggest such a relaxed standard, whereby every workplace obligation is 
necessarily prima facie discriminatory. See e.g. Shilton, “Work–Family Divide,” supra note 23 
at 49 (seeming to suggest that the obligation to attend work is itself generally and necessarily 
prima facie discrimination on the basis of family status). 
28. See e.g. Seeley v Canadian National Railway, 2010 CHRT 23 at para 120. To a similar efect, 
see e.g. SMS Equipment, supra note 12 at para 77; Johnstone No 1, supra note 17 at para 29. 
See generally Kanee & Cembrowski, supra note 25. 
29. Ontario Human Rights Comm v Simpsons-Sears Ltd, [1985] 2 SCR 536 at 558. 
30. British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v BCGSEU, [1999] 3 SCR 
3 [Meiorin]. Te Meiorin analysis itself has three steps. Once the prima facie case is made 
out, the respondent must show that: (1) the purpose or goal of the measure is rationally 
connected to the function being performed, (2) it was adopted in good faith, and (3) the 
standard is reasonably necessary to accomplish its purpose or goal, in the sense that the 
defendant cannot accommodate persons with the characteristics of the claimant without 
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To address that issue, the Supreme Court of Canada has since developed a 
three part test for prima facie discrimination, which has been most clearly set 
out by the Court in Moore.31 Te Moore test has three elements: (1) whether 
the claimant has a protected characteristic under the applicable human rights 
legislation; (2) whether the claimant sufered an adverse efect relating to 
employment; and (3) whether the protected characteristic was a factor in the 
adverse treatment.32 
In many cases, particularly those involving family status, the frst two steps 
are not seriously disputed. Everyone has a “family status,” and rarely do persons 
bring human rights complaints if they have not been deprived of a beneft 
or sufered any burden or disadvantage (concepts which tend to be broadly 
defned).33 Te critical question is nearly always the third: Was the protected 
characteristic a legally signifcant or relevant “factor” in the adverse treatment? 
And what does it mean to be a “factor” in a particular case? 
B. ESTABLISHING A “CONNECTION” 
As just described in Part I(A), under the Moore test, identifying a meaningful 
link between the characteristic and adverse treatment is necessarily to establish 
discrimination, as opposed to merely diferent, adverse, or even unfair treatment.34 
To use an obvious example, an employee may be a woman, and she may be 
terminated, but if there is no connection between those two facts—for instance, 
the employee was fred for engaging in abusive or unprofessional conduct—the 
termination is not prima facie discriminatory, and there is no need to determine 
whether there was a bona fde justifcation for the adverse treatment. 
Of course, few cases are that easy. Indeed, determining what constitutes the 
necessary link or connection between the protected characteristic and the harm 
sufered has been an enduring problem in discrimination law, both in Charter and 
human rights code jurisprudence. While everyone agrees that there must be some 
link between a protected ground and the adverse impact in order to constitute a 
31. Moore v British Columbia, 2012 SCC 61 [Moore]. 
32. Ibid at para 33. 
33. Cf Durikova, supra note 14 (upholding the respondent’s application to preliminarily dismiss 
the case on the second factor, concluding that the respondent’s denial of the complainant’s 
extended leave application would not “result in a real disadvantage to her relationship with 
her child or her parental responsibilities” at para 69). 
34. See Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v Bombardier Inc 
(Bombardier Aerospace Training Center), 2015 SCC 39 at paras 43-52 (clarifying that the 
third part of the Moore test requires a link between the allegedly discriminatory action or rule 
and the ground, but not a causal link). 











“factor,” that is not really the question in contested cases. Te question concerns 
the circumstances in which adjudicators should be willing to fnd that the ground 
was truly a “factor” in adverse treatment. While this will present little or no 
problem in many types of cases, it will be considerably more difcult in others. 
II. FAMILY STATUS DISCRIMINATION 
A. THE MOORE TEST 
Te difculty of identifying the necessary “connection” between a claimant’s 
family status and an adverse impact they sufer, for the purpose of the Moore 
analysis, is one that arises primarily in the context of adverse efects or indirect 
discrimination.35 Cases involving direct discrimination on the basis of family 
status are relatively easy from a legal or conceptual perspective.36 If an employee 
is terminated because she has children, is not hired because she is unwed, or if a 
rule or policy expressly incorporates any such characteristics of family status, that 
is prima facie discriminatory. Tat is the case even if that family status is only a 
part of the employer’s motivation (i.e., a “factor” among others), and even if an 
employer can establish that the adverse efects may have been sufered anyway. 
Te real analytical difculty tends to arise in indirect discrimination cases, 
given that every conceivable workplace rule or requirement will interfere with 
time spent with family, or some caregiving responsibility, to some extent. Indeed, 
as has been commonly observed, the very fact of holding employment and 
being required to attend work has a necessarily “diferential impact” on persons 
with dependent family members as compared with individuals without them, 
as it requires those in the former group to be away from their family.37 As the 
British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal explained, “almost every work-related 
35. While the Supreme Court eliminated the distinction between direct and adverse efects 
discrimination cases for the purposes of the accommodation analysis (see Meiorin, supra
note 30), it is helpful to consider these categories in understanding the necessary analysis to 
undertake at the third stage of the Moore test. 
36. As with other direct discrimination cases, the difculty is often an evidentiary or factual 
one, i.e., how to prove that family status was among the reasons for adverse treatment, 
at least where it is not spelled out expressly in a rule or policy (i.e., “we do not hire pregnant 
women”) but rather based on a discretionary decision. See e.g. the analysis in Peel Law 
Association v Pieters, 2013 ONCA 396. 
37. See Siemens Milltronics Process Instruments Inc v Canadian National Federation of Independent 
Unions (Employees Association of Milltronics) Local 3005, [2012] OLAA No 513 at para 64 
(Arbitrator: John Stout) (recognizing that work attendance conficts with family obligations). 
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requirement has the potential to interfere, to some degree, with an employee’s 
family obligations.”38 
If the threshold for meeting the third stage of the Moore test was as simple as 
showing a “connection” between family status and adverse treatment (regardless 
of the strength or proximity of this connection, or the impact on the individual 
claimant), then imposing any workplace requirement would meet the third 
stage of the Moore test. Tis would result in a duty on the employer’s part to 
accommodate the employee’s family activities or obligations to the point of 
undue hardship. Such a duty would arise no matter how easily the employee 
could avoid the confict, no matter how insignifcant the asserted family 
“activity” in question, nor how tenuous the link between the accommodation 
sought and the family status in question. It could even arise in circumstances 
where an employee deliberately (or perhaps subconsciously) decides to create 
an otherwise unnecessary confict between family and workplace obligations, 
so as to avoid the latter. 
To use an extreme example, an employee may choose to schedule a child’s 
sporting activity during his or her regular shift, despite the ability to schedule 
the activity before or after the shift, thus manufacturing an entirely avoidable 
confict. Were it not for the employee’s family status, there would have been no 
conficting sporting activity. Hence, there is at least a superfcial “connection” 
between family status and an adverse impact (i.e., the requirement to attend 
38. Miller v BCTF (No 2), 2009 BCHRT 34 at para 26 [emphasis added]. See also Adair, supra
note 11 (“Tere is an inevitable tension between going to work and attending to family 
responsibilities, particularly childcare. Attending at work on any shift interferes with time with 
one’s family. Work, by its nature, while providing the means to support a family, also interferes 
with family time.” Ibid at paras 119-20 [emphasis added]). See also Misetich, supra note 11 at 
para 42. Vice-Chair Jennifer Scott stated: 
In my view, these cases have attempted to narrow the ambit of the ground of family status by 
developing specifc tests for discrimination on that basis. Tis was done because of the real 
concern that not every negative impact on a family obligation, or confict between a family and 
work obligation, is discriminatory. I agree with that concern… [emphasis added]. 
See also Te Municipal Corporation of the City of Yellowknife v AB and Te Northwest 
Territories Human Rights Commission, 2018 NWTSC 50 at para 69. Justice 
Charbonneau stated: 
[I]t must also be recognized that the protection against discrimination based on family status 
in the employment context raises issues that are unique. As the Commission acknowledges, 
it gives rise to inevitable tension between work obligations and family responsibilities. Work 
obligations always interfere with family time. Not every such interference should engage 
human rights protections. Tese are reasons that may justify the use of a diferent legal 
framework when that ground of discrimination is raised. 
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work, or the risk of discipline for failing to do so), that could (on some theories) 
impose an obligation to accommodate the employee’s desire to support his or 
her child’s sporting activity, unless it was “impossible” to do so without undue 
hardship. However, few would suggest that an employee’s deliberate choice to 
create an unnecessary workplace confict in this way should be treated as prima 
facie discrimination by the employer, or that a desire to participate in every 
conceivable family-related activity on the schedule of an employee’s choosing is 
sufcient to establish a need for accommodation to the point of undue hardship.39 
Te problem is the same whether the confict is created deliberately to 
avoid workplace obligations, or whether the employee’s decision unnecessarily 
or avoidably achieves the same result. Whether an employee’s decision to create 
an avoidable confict between work and family obligations is deliberate, due to 
inattention, or inadvertence, it is still avoidable. 
Moreover, while direct discrimination on the basis of family status covers 
a relatively limited range of circumstances, adverse efects discrimination based 
on a confict with family activities, responsibilities, and obligations creates an 
enormous range of potential conficts that will have to be addressed. It is the 
ubiquity of potential conficts between workplace and family obligations that 
raises the concern over the “threshold” in family status cases, due to the sheer 
breadth of family-related activities and obligations that can interfere with work 
obligations, and the employee’s ability to impact the extent to which those 
obligations create a confict. 
In this way, family status claims are diferent from many other types of 
protected grounds. For instance, very rarely will an individual’s race, ethnicity, 
or place of origin, create a fundamental confict with attending work, such that 
the personal characteristic in question needs to be “accommodated.” For the most 
part, individuals simply need to be not discriminated against on the basis of their 
race, ethnicity, or place of origin. Similarly, while sex or religion claims may 
require accommodation in certain cases, due to biological diferences or unique 
religious obligations, these protected characteristics rarely create the same type of 
necessary and fundamental “confict” with workplace obligations as many family 
status claims, in the sense that the mere obligation to come to work at all may 
confict with one’s ability to care for a child or loved one. It is this unique aspect 
39. See Johnstone No 2, supra note 17 (where the Federal Court of Appeal noted that “[i]t is also 
important not to trivialize human rights legislation by extending human rights protection to 
personal family choices, such as participation of children in dance classes, sports events like 
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of family status claims that has created a need for a nuanced approach to the third 
“connection” step of the Moore test in the family status context.40 
B. SIMILARITY OF APPROACHES ACROSS CANADA 
Tis unique difculty in adverse efects family status cases has been noted by a wide 
range of adjudicators, leading to a consensus that a mere superfcial “connection” 
between family-related activities and obligations and not fulflling workplace 
obligations is insufcient to demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination. 
As noted above, the ultimate question is: When does this interference connected 
to family obligations, activities, or circumstances become discrimination on the 
basis of family status? 
To answer this question, adjudicators have almost uniformly acknowledged 
that adverse efects family status claims require adjudicators to develop a nuanced 
appreciation of the circumstances of a particular claimant, in order to distinguish 
between those family and workplace obligations that create a genuine confict 
which cannot easily or reasonably be avoided, and those that can be avoided or 
otherwise do not rise to the level of harm that would constitute discrimination.41 
Only in the former case can we meaningfully say that an employee has been 
discriminated against on the basis of their family status, rather than being 
disadvantaged due to a choice or preference that is, in a meaningful sense, 
independent from the status itself. 
While diferent ways of addressing this fundamental concern have developed, 
there seems to be a consensus among adjudicators that where it is reasonably 
possible for the individual to fulfll both family and workplace obligations—that 
is, where there is a meaningful choice available to the claimant that would allow 
him or her to fulfll both—it is not discriminatory to expect them to do so. In our 
view, this is the golden thread running through these cases. 
40. See Johnstone No 2, supra note 17 (noting that this does not necessarily involve creating a 
wholly diferent “test” for prima facie discrimination, but rather the recognition that the test 
for prima facie discrimination “is necessarily fexible and contextual because it is applied in 
cases with many diferent factual situations involving various grounds of discrimination” 
at para 83). See also Flatt FCA, supra note 8 at paras 26-27; Regina School Division No 4 of 
Saskatchewan v Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 3766 (Smith Grievance), [2018] 
SLAA No 13 (Arbitrator: William FJ Hood) (noting that the factors articulated in Johnstone 
No. 2 “do not alter the Moore test for prima facie discrimination but rather adds some guiding 
contextual considerations” at para 62). 
41. See International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 636 v Power Stream Inc (Bender 
Grievance), [2009] OLAA No 447 at paras 54-56 (Arbitrator: Norm Jesin); Coast Mountains 
School District 82 v British Columbia Teachers’ Federation (Sutherland Grievance), [2006] 
BCCAAA No 184 at para 39 (Arbitrator: DR Munroe). 
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A useful starting point is the Federal Court of Appeal’s decision in Johnstone 
No. 2, where the Court recognized, through a four criteria test, that a claimant 
must be unable to reasonably perform both childcare and work obligations before 
a prima facie discrimination case can be established. Tis is the essence of the 
standard proposed, and is captured in the third and fourth aspects of the Johnstone 
No. 2 test: that the claimant must “demonstrate that reasonable eforts have been 
expended to meet those childcare obligations through reasonable alternative 
solutions, and that no such alternative solution is reasonably accessible”; and 
that the workplace rule must interfere with a family obligation in a non-trivial 
way.42 Tus, while some aspects of the Johnstone No. 2 test seem to us to be 
unnecessary,43 the essence of the test is simply a more elaborate way of setting out 
the basic principle that a prima facie case of discrimination will not be established 
where an employee has the meaningful choice, or the reasonable ability, to fulfll 
both sets of obligations.44 
While Johnstone No. 2 has been criticized on a number of bases,45 the essence 
of that decision just indicated is compatible with the decisions often said to ofer 
a more enlightened approach.46 For instance, while the Federal Court’s 1993 
42. Johnstone No 2, supra note 17 at paras 93, 96-97. 
43. For instance, in our respectful view, the requirement for a claimant to establish a “legal” 
responsibility for the caregiving in question, which is the essence of the frst two steps of the 
Johnstone No. 2 test, is problematic. It departs from the approach taken by other adjudicators 
in family status cases and other discrimination cases. While an individual may not have a 
legal obligation to provide care to a parent, a spouse, a sibling, or other family member in 
the sense that they could be held criminally or otherwise liable for a failure to provide that 
care, there is no question that providing such care may be a personal or moral imperative in 
particular circumstances. Te requirement that a claimant establish a legal obligation would 
risk efectively converting protection for family status into protection for “parental status,” 
which would be an unwarranted narrowing of the scope of the protection. In addition, 
requiring a claimant to establish a “legal” responsibility could sidetrack reasonably 
expeditious labour arbitrations or human rights hearings into detailed examinations of 
criminal and tort law, to determine whether the responsibility in question is one otherwise 
imposed by law, which is a development that should be avoided. 
44. See Flatt, supra note 8 at para 170, per Richardson: 
What this is to say is that despite the diference in the formulations of the test for 
discrimination on the basis of family status, the approach of the CHRT in Brown
and Johnstone is and was the same as that in Campbell River. Both sides of the apparent 
debate were dealing with the same types of fact scenario. Te scenarios all involved work 
obligations or rules that had serious impacts on substantial family obligation which the 
parents in question had made concerted eforts to solve – but to no avail. [emphasis added]
45. We share some of these concerns. See supra note 43. 
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decision in Brown is often applauded for ofering a more generous approach to 
family status discrimination claims, it does not suggest that every potential or 
avoidable confict between family and workplace obligations constitutes prima 
facie discrimination. Rather, Brown also recognizes that in order to constitute 
prima facie discrimination, the reasonable ability of the claimant to meet 
both workplace and family obligations must be abridged by the workplace 
obligation in question:47 
[T]he evidence must demonstrate that family status includes the status of being a
parent and includes the duties and obligations as a member of society and further that
the Complainant was a parent incurring those duties and obligations. As a consequence
of those duties and obligations, combined with an employer rule, the Complainant
was unable to participate equally and fully in employment with her employer. 
On this standard, if an individual is able to take reasonable steps to avoid a 
confict between work and family obligations, it cannot be said that they were 
“unable” to participate fully in employment with the employer. Tey were able to 
do so, and unreasonably chose not to. 
Te same can be said about Hoyt, another Canadian Human Rights Tribunal 
decision which followed the approach in Brown. While criticizing other decisions 
for placing an undue burden on the claimant, the tribunal there held that a prima 
facie case was made out because a careful review of the evidence demonstrated 
that the claimant “made an attempt to secure, in a very short period of time, good 
quality child care that would not cause undue distress to her young daughter,” 
after which she still needed some accommodation.48 In other words, despite 
reasonable eforts, the complainant was not reasonably able to avoid the confict 
between her family and workplace obligations. Tis captures the essence of the 
test in Johnstone No. 2, as well as our proposed approach. 
Te same observation can be made about the Ontario Human Rights Tribunal’s 
decision in Misetich, where, despite criticizing the Johnstone No. 2 approach, the 
Tribunal went on to require the claimant to demonstrate facts that “result[ed] 
in real disadvantage to the parent/child relationship and the responsibilities that 
fow[ed] from that relationship, and/or to the employee’s work.”49 It justifed this 
standard on grounds similar to those proposed here. First, the Tribunal recognized 
that “not every negative impact on a family obligation, or confict between a 
family and work obligation, is discriminatory.”50 Second, the Tribunal recognized 
47. Brown, supra note 16 at 13 [emphasis added]. 
48. Hoyt, supra note 16 at para 129. 
49. Misetich, supra note 11 at para 54; see also Osborne-Brown, supra note 7 at 103. 
50. Misetich, supra note 11 at para 42. 









that a factual scenario will constitute prima facie discrimination where it “puts 
the employee in the position of having to choose between working and caregiving 
or if it negatively impacts the parent/child relationship and the responsibilities 
that fow from that relationship in a signifcant way.”51 Presumably, where an 
individual has a third choice that allows them to fulfll both workplace and 
caregiving obligations, the claimant need not choose between them nor sufer 
any negative impact on the parent/child relationship, and the test is not made 
out. Moreover, in making this determination, the Tribunal in Misetech held that:52 
Assessing the impact of the impugned rule is done contextually and may include 
consideration of the other supports available to the applicant. Tese supports are 
relevant to assessing both the family-related need and the impact of the impugned 
rule on that need. 
In other words, as Sheila Osborne-Brown points out, “despite its criticism of a 
special test for family status, the OHRT in Misetich efectively did something 
strikingly similar.”53 Te Tribunal in Misetich was alert to, and attempted to resist, 
this conclusion by suggesting that there is a “fundamental distinction” between 
considering the reasonable options available to an employee as part of “the overall 
assessment” at the prima facie stage, and considering them as an aspect of the test 
for prima facie discrimination. As the Tribunal made the point:54 
Considering the supports available to an applicant may appear to some to be 
akin to considering whether an applicant can self-accommodate. It is diferent 
in a fundamental way. Requiring an applicant to self-accommodate as part of 
the discrimination test means the applicant bears the onus of fnding a solution 
to the family/work confict; it is only when he/she cannot that discrimination is 
established. Tis is diferent than considering the extent to which other supports for 
family-related needs are available in the overall assessment of whether an applicant 
has met his/her burden of proving discrimination. 
Whether or not the distinction is as fundamental as the Tribunal suggested, 
in our view, either approach is consistent with the standard we advocate. Te 
fundamental point is that, prior to fnding that prima facie discrimination is 
made out, sufcient to justify imposing a duty to accommodate, a distinction 
must be drawn between reasonably avoidable and unavoidable conficts between 
workplace and family obligations. It is only where the “other supports” or options 
51. Ibid at para 54. 
52. Ibid at para 55. For an application of this consideration, see e.g. Tapa v Suisha Gardens 
Limited Les Jardins Suisha Limitée, 2016 HRTO 1316 at para 70. 
53. Osborne-Brown, supra note 7 at 99. 
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available to an applicant to avoid the confict either do not exist, or are not 
in fact reasonably available, that a need for accommodation will arise. In this 
respect, the concept of “self-accommodation” may simply be an unhelpful way 
of describing the approach that nearly all adjudicators appear to accept, i.e., that 
a duty to accommodate will not arise where an employee is reasonably able to 
arrange his or her afairs in a manner which avoids any confict between work 
and family obligations. 
Te closest to an outlier from this approach may be the SMS Equipment 
case, which is another decision that is often cited for taking a more generous 
approach to family status discrimination.55 In that case, the Alberta Queen’s 
Bench expressly rejected the notion that an employee was under an obligation to 
“self-accommodate,” which the court understood to involve requiring a claimant 
to not only “prove that a workplace rule has a discriminatory impact on them, 
but that they were unable to avoid that impact.”56 Leaving aside the concern 
expressed above—that this analysis depends on the assumption that any potential 
confict between workplace and family obligations automatically constitutes 
prima facie discrimination on the basis of family status—the SMS Equipment 
case may be less of an outlier than it appears at frst blush. 
In this respect, it is notable that the court in SMS Equipment relied on 
Johnstone No. 2 for the proposition that claimants must establish that a child 
is under the claimant’s care and supervision, and that the childcare obligation 
at issue engages the individual’s legal responsibility for that child as opposed to 
a personal choice.57 According to the court, this fows necessarily from the fact 
that “family status includes childcare obligations, not personal choices.”58 Tis 
recognition is the essence of the standard we advocate, the point of which is to 
determine whether a particular confict between work and family obligations is 
the result of the individual’s family status, or rather is the result of a personal 
choice between viable options. 
Indeed, it might be speculated that the court’s analysis in SMS Equipment 
may have been infuenced by the fact that the arbitrator had clearly found that 
the claimant had made reasonable attempts to fnd alternative arrangements, 
but that there was simply no reasonable option available to her that would have 
avoided the confict. Te arbitrator found, in essence, that the employee was 
55. See e.g. Adair, supra note 11 at para 132; United Nurses, supra note 15 at paras 39, 41-47. See 
generally Kanee & Cembrowski, supra note 25 at 50-51. 
56. SMS Equipment, supra note 12 at para 77. 
57. Ibid at para 76. 
58. Ibid. 
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left without any reasonable options: She could either use her modest salary to 
pay for childcare both while she was at work and while she was sleeping, “or 
she [could] care for them herself and not be properly rested to fulfll either her 
work or parenting responsibilities,” which the Arbitrator held “clearly was not 
a viable choice.”59 Had the evidentiary record shown that the claimant had a 
perfectly viable choice that would have avoided any workplace confict, one 
wonders if the court would have rejected any consideration of this fact until after 
the employer had undertaken accommodation to the point of undue hardship. 
Moreover, as long as a sensitive and fexible approach to the question of whether 
the confict was reasonably unavoidable is adopted, rather than asking whether 
all potential alternative arrangements—however fanciful, difcult, unreasonable, 
or practically unavailable to the claimant—have been exhausted, there would 
have been no need to reject any consideration of this factor entirely.60 
We also think that some of the more heavily-criticized decisions in this area 
have adopted analyses that are consistent, at least in essence, with the approach 
we advocate in this article. Tis can be seen, most notably, in the 2004 decision 
by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Campbell River, which was recently 
re-afrmed by the court in the 2019 decision of Suen.61 In Campbell River, the 
Court of Appeal held that prima facie discrimination would be established if a 
change in a term or condition of employment imposed by an employer results 
in a “serious interference with a substantial parental or other family duty or 
obligation of the employee.”62 Whether or not this is made out “will depend on 
the circumstances of each case.”63 
Tere is little doubt that the court in Campbell River took a more restrictive 
view of family status discrimination than in other cases, noting that in its view, 
the “vast majority” of cases would not pass the prima facie threshold.64 However, 
59. SMS Equipment, supra note 12 at paras 57, 83; see also Communications, Energy, and 
Paperworkers Union, Local 707 v SMS Equipment Inc (Cahill-Saunders Grievance), [2013] 
AGAA No 41 at paras 62-63, 70-72 (Arbitrator: Lyle Kanee). 
60. Te SMS Equipment case has recently been interpreted as attempting to establish a bright 
line separation in which all such “self-accommodation” eforts are only considered at the 
accommodation stage of the analysis. See United Nurses, supra note 15. 
61. Suen BCCA, supra note 18. Te Court of Appeal in Suen did not in fact address the concerns 
with the Campbell River test, but rather found that it was bound by it in the absence of a fve 
judge panel to decide whether it should be overturned, and the request for a fve-judge panel 
in that case had been denied. Te Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the application for 
leave to appeal. See Suen v Envirocon Environmental Services, ULC, 2019 SCCA 108. 
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read generously, we think the essence of the Campbell River approach seeks to 
achieve the same result on the same logic as in the other cases canvassed above, 
albeit through a diferent verbal formulation. Under Campbell River, where 
an individual has an important family obligation, and there is a signifcant 
interference imposed by workplace obligations, that will demonstrate a prima 
facie case. Tis can be recast in more palatable or familiar terms, by pointing out 
that a trivial interference with an insignifcant family obligation—for instance, 
to cheer for a child at a particular sporting event—will not rise to the level of a 
prima facie case. In other words, while the specifc language used in Campbell 
River may not be ideal,65 and the requirement for a “change” in circumstances 
is unhelpful,66 the essence of the standard proposed seems similar to the cases 
reviewed above. It seeks to distinguish between family obligations that truly make 
an employee “unable” to fulfll both family and workplace obligations, as the 
term was used in Hoyt and Brown,67 from circumstances where it is perfectly 
viable to fulfll both sets of obligations. 
65. With respect, it seems to us that adding qualifers—such as a “substantial” family obligation 
or a “serious” interference—is neither helpful nor necessary. Te point is simply that a 
trivial burden or insignifcant interference will not constitute a discriminatory impact, 
as is normally the case. Tis recognition reunites the cases under the simple standard we 
propose: that a workplace rule or decision will constitute prima facie discrimination on 
the basis of family status where an employee sufers a non-trivial disadvantage that could 
not have been avoided by taking other reasonable steps to fulfll both their workplace and 
family obligations. 
66. While the essence of the Campbell River approach is consistent with the adjudicative 
consensus, our view is that other aspects of that decision are not. In particular, the “change” 
requirement essentially creates a presumption that all workplace rules are non-discriminatory 
on the basis of family status as long as the rule was in place from the outset of employment. 
With respect, we think that this is a departure from the orthodox standard of prima facie 
discrimination. If an employer could avoid a claim of discrimination merely by stating 
that the employee was aware of a discriminatory rule at the point of hire, the value of 
human rights codes as a means of testing the discriminatory impact of workplace rules or 
requirements would be signifcantly undermined. 
67. It is perhaps worth emphasizing that the claimant in Campbell River—who was not 
reasonably able to arrange for childcare within the period required by her employer, and thus 
had no meaningful choice available to her to fulfll both sets of obligations—was successful 
in her claim before the British Columbia Court of Appeal, as she would have been under 
either the Hoyt or Johnstone tests. Indeed, a number of cases since then have been found to be 
discriminatory on either the Campbell River or other tests, suggesting that the essence of the 
Campbell River approach is generally within the consensus that has developed. Alternatively, 
the Tribunal has simply applied each of the tests in rendering its decision. See e.g. Adair,
supra note 11; Durikova, supra note 14. 











Tus, leaving aside what we consider to be marginal and unnecessary hurdles 
found in the Campbell River and Johnstone No. 2 tests,68 a close review of the 
leading decisions demonstrate a broad consensus. Adjudicators have agreed that 
not every asserted confict between family and workplace obligations constitutes 
prima facie discrimination on the basis of family status, and the vast majority of 
adjudicators have accepted it is appropriate to consider whether reasonable steps 
were or could have been taken that would eliminate the confict as a key part 
of that analysis. 
Ultimately, in our view, all of these cases are fundamentally compatible 
with the approach proposed here. Family status will only be a “factor” in adverse 
treatment, for the purposes of the Moore test, where the claimant does not have 
a meaningful choice or reasonable ability to fulfll both family and workplace 
obligations. Tat is the point when an impact on family-related activities or 
obligations constitutes an adverse impact on the basis of family status sufcient to 
make out a prima facie case. Although there are various ways of seeking to identify 
the point at which a claimant’s circumstances demonstrate that a meaningful 
choice remained available to him or her, we suggest that the approach proposed 
here generally unites the essence of the various approaches that have been taken 
to date in the context of family status claims. 
We do not mean to suggest that the various approaches adopted by adjudicators 
in this context are identical, particularly in relation to certain auxiliary (and in 
our view, unnecessary and unhelpful) requirements that have been imposed 
under some of the tests.69 However, despite the clear rhetorical divide between 
these cases, the substantive distinctions between them appear to us to be largely 
a mirage. While it can be disputed what verbal formulation is the best way to 
describe the applicable standard, in our view, nearly all of these approaches turn 
on whether an employee in a particular factual situation has a meaningful choice 
or reasonable ability to fulfll both family and workplace obligations.70 
68. Campbell River, supra note 18 at para 39. See also the discussion in notes 43, 64. 
69. Ibid. 
70. Again, SMS Equipment may fairly be considered to be outside of this consensus, although we 
think that the fndings of the arbitrator are fully consistent with the approach we advocate, 
and that the distinction between the cases is not as signifcant as it may appear, for the 
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III. PROPOSED APPROACH: MEANINGFUL CHOICE OR 
REASONABLE ABILITY 
So far, we have proposed that, in applying the third stage of the Moore analysis in 
the family status context, the essential consensus in this area requires adjudicators 
to focus on whether the claimant has a meaningful choice or reasonable ability 
to fulfll both family and workplace obligations. If the claimant does not, the 
third stage of the Moore test will be met, shifting the onus to the employer to 
show why it was impossible to accommodate the claimant without sufering 
undue hardship. 
Given that this approach is based on what we consider to be the adjudicative 
consensus, it is necessary to address the underlying concern with the decisions 
that adopt that consensus. Te most notable concern is that a consideration of 
whether an employee can reasonably avoid a workplace confict efectively creates 
a uniquely onerous prima facie test in the family status context, as it amounts 
to an obligation of “self-accommodation.” We believe that, to the contrary, our 
proposed approach is consistent with the general approach taken in prima facie
discrimination cases, where discrimination will be established if a claimant is in a 
meaningful sense unable to meet certain workplace criteria or requirements as a 
result of the protected characteristic. 
In some circumstances, the burden on the claimant may be met by 
demonstrating what the requirement is (e.g., mobility or aerobic capacity), and by 
establishing that persons with a certain protected characteristic (e.g., a particular 
disability or gender), including the claimant, have substantially greater difculty 
than others in meeting that requirement because of the characteristic.71 However, 
in other cases, adverse treatment cannot be directly attributable to the protected 
ground in the same way. Tat is, despite the protected ground being in some 
way “connected” to the adverse treatment, it cannot be said that it was a legally 
signifcant “factor” in the adverse treatment (i.e., sufcient to meet the third stage 
of the Moore test). Tis will often be the case where an individual, notwithstanding 
a certain particular characteristic, has “meaningful choice” over whether or not 
to comply with a workplace rule or standard, or is “reasonably able” to fulfll 
the workplace-related obligations, notwithstanding the protected characteristic. 
Whether that is the case will necessarily depend on the specifc facts of the case 
and the protected characteristic at issue. 
71. See e.g. Meiorin, supra note 30 (regarding a test based on aerobic capacity; women on average 
have lower aerobic capacity than men). 








Where adverse treatment is more properly attributed to the choice of the 
individual, rather than to the protected characteristic, the underlying purpose 
of human rights law—to protect people from unfair or arbitrary treatment 
based on characteristics beyond their control—is not engaged. Tis fows from 
the common sense proposition that individuals cannot and should not be 
disadvantaged because of their innate personal characteristics, over which they 
have no control, but they can be subject to diferential treatment based on their 
deliberate conduct and choices, where the conduct or choices are in a meaningful 
sense independent from the protected characteristic. 
Te application of this principle is seen in case law dealing with alleged 
discrimination on the basis of religion and disability, including addiction. Tese 
cases can often present similar difculties as adverse efects family status cases, 
namely, distinguishing between a negative impact resulting from the possession 
of a protected characteristic and an impact resulting from an individual’s 
independent choices or decisions. 
A. SIMILARITY TO RELIGION CASES 
Of course, any adverse treatment based directly on religion clearly triggers the 
purposes and objects of human rights laws.72 Tere is no diference in these types 
of cases between religion, disability, family status, or any other protected ground. 
Any rule or decision which is “based on,” or directly takes into account, a person’s 
religion as a reason for adverse treatment, will be prima facie discriminatory. 
Further, the fact that individuals on some level “choose” to follow certain 
religious beliefs or precepts does not enter into the equation. As noted above, that 
would be considered a “problematic use” of choice scenario, and irrelevant for the 
purposes of applying the human rights legislation. To deprive an individual of 
human rights code protection on the basis of that kind of “choice” would entirely 
defeat the basis for the protection. 
However, indirect discrimination cases involving religious belief can 
raise the difcult question of whether or not a sincere religious belief actually 
precludes adherence to workplace rules or requirements in a manner that is more 
than trivial or insubstantial.73 Because certain religious obligations may leave 
individuals with a meaningful choice or a range of options as to how to fulfll the 
religious precept, adjudicators must sometimes determine whether a particular 
72. See e.g. Wright v College and Association of Registered Nurses of Alberta (Appeals Committee), 
2012 ABCA 267 at para 53; British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) v British 
Columbia (Council of Human Rights), [1999] 3 SCR 868. 
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workplace rule is compatible with the religious belief in question, or whether the 
person is efectively precluded by their religious beliefs from compliance with the 
workplace requirement. 
Of course, as in other contexts, some adverse efects cases based on religion 
are easy on their facts, at least as far as the prima facie case is concerned. For 
instance, where a person has a sincere religious belief that they are not permitted 
to work on Sunday, and their job requires that they work on Sunday, the 
connection between the ground and the adverse treatment is self-evident and 
unavoidable. Te individual does not have a “meaningful choice” or “reasonable 
ability” to fulfll both workplace and religious obligations—they must choose 
one or the other. Other cases, however, will be more difcult, because the nature 
of the workplace requirement and the person’s religious obligations may allow 
the individual to comply with the workplace requirement without undermining 
their sincere religious commitments.74 
Consider the case of Seneca College, where the employer school board 
implemented a course scheduling program that did not include exemptions 
from the schedule for conficts with religious beliefs.75 Te claimant had a 
sincere religious belief that he had to “give back” to the community, which was 
accepted by the arbitrator. However, the claimant chose to exercise this religious 
belief by teaching a course on Monday mornings at a Jewish high school (for 
wages), which conficted with his obligation to work on Mondays. Te arbitrator 
found that a prima facie case of discrimination had not been made out, for the 
following reasons:76 
We cannot see from the statement of particulars how the scheduling process at 
issue, applied to all employees by the College can objectively be considered as an 
infringement of the grievor’s requirement to give back to his community. Tat would 
in essence require the College to accommodate the grievor’s simple and understandable 
desire to hold a second job. But given that it is not asserted that the grievor is prevented 
from pursuing other avenues from giving back to his community, and given that the 
scheduling process is designed to apply to all teachers, we cannot see how a case can be 
made on the particulars alleged that the grievor is being discriminated against because 
of his creed. … In this case it is not the requirement to give back that is being infringed 
but the particular choice of how to fulfll it. Tis does not constitute an infringement 
of a religious requirement in our view and therefore the particulars, even if accepted, 
do not constitute discrimination on the basis of creed. For these reasons it is our 
74. For the same approach in the services context, see Nijjar v Canada 3000 
Airlines, 1999 CHRD 3. 
75. Ontario Public Service Employees Union, Local 560 v Seneca College, [2014] OLAA No 263 
(Arbitrator: Norm Jesin). 
76. Ibid at paras 12, 14 [emphasis added]. 









conclusion that the College’s preliminary motion should be allowed and that the 
grievance must be dismissed. 
In that case, there was no question that there was a sincere religious belief, 
adverse treatment, and that religion was “related” or “connected” to the adverse 
treatment. Indeed, the link was likely causal: but-for the claimant’s religious 
belief, there would have been no religious-based requirement to “give back,” and 
hence no potential work confict. However, as the arbitrator recognized, “it is not 
the requirement to give back that is being infringed but the particular choice of 
how to fulfll it.”77 In other words, it was not prima facie discriminatory because 
it was not unequal treatment “based on” a religious belief, but rather a personal 
choice that did not fow necessarily or directly from that religious belief. 
A similar approach was adopted in the case of Ontario Public Service 
Employees Union, in which the employee claimed that his employer’s refusal to 
transfer him back to his home in Ottawa from his job in Peterborough constituted 
discrimination on the basis of religion because it prevented him from praying 
with his wife at home in the morning and afternoon.78 In allowing the employer’s 
non-suit motion, the arbitrator implicitly recognized that the employee had a 
meaningful choice in complying with the employer’s rule to attend work at the 
Peterborough ofce:79 
Te Employer’s rules do not require the Grievor to live far away from his workplace 
in Peterborough and the Grievor’s religious beliefs do not require that he and his 
wife continue to live in Ottawa. Accepting for the purposes of this decision that the 
Grievor’s religious beliefs require him to pray daily with his wife in both the morning 
and the evening, the Grievor and his wife can do so anywhere. Te interference 
which the Grievor experiences with practicing Sandhya on a daily basis arises not 
from any confict between the impugned rule and his religious beliefs, but from the 
fact that he lives in Ottawa notwithstanding that his job is in Peterborough. Unless 
one were to conclude that it is unreasonable to expect the Grievor to move from 
Ottawa to Peterborough, there is no basis for concluding that the Employer’s rule 
interferes with the Grievor’s religious beliefs. For reasons stated above, it is my view 
there is insufcient evidence to demonstrate that it is unreasonable to expect the 
Grievor to move to Peterborough. 
Other similar scenarios could be imagined in the context of adverse efects 
discrimination claims on the basis of religion. For instance, an employee at a busy 
restaurant may have a sincere religious belief that he or she needs to pray for an 
77. Ibid. 
78. Ontario Public Service Employees Union v Ontario (Ministry of Natural Resources and Forestry) 
(Bharti Grievance), [2015] OGSBA No 40 (Arbitrator: Ian Anderson). 
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hour each day, but no particular religious belief as to when that must occur. Te 
employee in this scenario requests an hour of work every day during rush hour 
to pray. In that context, the request for accommodation for an additional hour 
of work during rush hour is, at least in a superfcial sense, “connected” to the 
claimant’s religious belief. Were it not for the religious belief, there would have 
been no request for an hour of during rush hour to pray. However, the request to 
take the time of during rush hour is not a product of the religious belief, it is the 
product of the employee’s (non-religious) preference or choice as to when to pray, 
and hence no case of prima facie discrimination would be made out. 
By contrast, some adherents of Islam may have a sincere religious belief that 
they must pray multiple times a day, and moreover, a sincere religious belief as 
to when those prayers must occur (e.g., dawn, midday, late afternoon, before 
sunset, and between sunset and midnight). Tis will tend to create a necessary
confict between any workplace obligation that corresponds with a necessary time 
for prayer, such that the employee cannot choose to both work on their regular 
schedule and fulfll the religious precept in question. Although the religious 
precepts in both of these scenarios create the possibility of a workplace confict, 
in the former case the confict is easily avoidable by the employee, and hence 
more of a product of individual choice than religious belief; in the latter, there is 
a necessary confict that fows from the belief itself. 
As another example, an employee may have a sincere religious belief in a 
particular religion but not in one of the values or commandments espoused by 
it. For instance, an employee may have a sincere religious belief in the Roman 
Catholic denomination but not in the belief that there needs to be a weekly 
day of rest or time of worship (i.e., the Sabbath). In that context, a request for 
accommodation for a shift of work on a particular Sunday may not necessarily be 
a product of the religious belief, but rather the employee’s preference. As in family 
status cases, the key point is that the adjudicator must consider the unique 
circumstances of that particular case in determining whether the claimant had a 
meaningful choice or reasonable ability to comply with the workplace obligation. 
Tese cases and scenarios closely resemble the fndings in the family status 
cases reviewed above. Tere is no question that an employee had sufered an 
adverse impact, had a protected characteristic, and that there is some sort of 
superfcial factual connection between the two. Nevertheless, where the employee 
could reasonably fulfll both workplace and religious obligations, because there 
was no necessary confict between the protected characteristic and the workplace 
obligation, a prima facie case would not be made out. We would not consider 
a consideration of the “alternatives” available to the claimant—for instance, 









an ability to pray during non-work hours—in this context an impermissible 
obligation to “self-accommodate”; it is simply a sensible requirement necessary 
to determine whether the prima facie case has been made out in the frst place. 
Failing to consider the “alternatives” available to the claimant at the prima 
facie stage would result in an obligation on the employer to accommodate 
circumstances in which the confict was entirely avoidable, or where another 
choice was available that was equally compatible with maintaining and fostering 
the beliefs in question. Tis would require the accommodation of choices, not 
personal characteristics. Put into the language of Brown, where an employee 
can reasonably fulfll his or her religious precepts without creating a confict 
with workplace obligations, it cannot be said that he or she “was unable to 
participate equally and fully in employment with her employer” as a result of a 
workplace obligation.80 
B. SIMILARITY TO DISABILITY AND ADDICTION CASES 
Adjudicating indirect discrimination claims is similarly difcult in the context of 
disabilities and addictions, which also requires a nuanced understanding of the 
particular factual scenarios. It is important in adverse efect disability cases, as it is 
in religion or family status cases, for the adjudicator to engage in a contextual, 
case-by-case analysis. Tis includes an individualized assessment of the disability 
and its impact on the claimant in relation to the specifc workplace requirement 
or standard which is in issue. Te mere existence of a “connection” between a 
disability and the adverse treatment is not always sufcient to render the rule 
discriminatory. Often, the question is whether the claimant’s disability, in all of 
the circumstances, efectively prevents him or her from meeting the workplace 
requirement. Only then can the disability be considered a “factor” in any 
resulting adverse treatment, for the purposes of the prima facie discrimination 
test. Te corollary is that if, despite the existence of a disability, an individual 
engages in behaviour or makes a decision that is reasonably within their control, 
it would not be “discriminatory” for an employer to take action in response to 
that behaviour.81 
80. Brown, supra note 16 at 15. 
81. It is likely for this reason that some jurisdictions, such as the United States and United 
Kingdom, have excluded addiction from the defnition of disability by legislation, 
or stipulated that those with an addiction may be held to the same employment requirements 
as those without addiction. See e.g. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 USC § 12114(a) 
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Te recent Supreme Court of Canada decision in Stewart provides a common 
illustration of this issue, in the context of addictions.82 Te claimant in that case 
was involved in an accident while driving a loader at a mine. He tested positive 
for drugs and later said he thought he was addicted to cocaine. His employer 
terminated his employment because he breached the company’s drug policy, 
and a subsequent human rights complaint was fled. Te Alberta Human Rights 
Tribunal dismissed the complaint, fnding that the claimant’s termination did 
not amount to prima facie discrimination because the claimant had the capacity 
to comply with the terms of the drug policy, and thus he would have been 
terminated whether he was an addict or a casual user. 
Chief Justice McLachlin, writing for the majority, upheld the Tribunal’s 
decision as reasonable. In doing so, she noted that the case involved the 
“application of settled principles on workplace disability discrimination,”83 and 
relied on the fact that the claimant had a meaningful choice as to whether he 
complied with the employer’s drug policy:84 
[Te Tribunal] concluded that … Mr. Stewart … “had the capacity to come forward 
and disclose his drug use” … and “did make rational choices in terms of his drug use” …
. While Mr. Stewart may have been in denial about his addiction, he knew he should not 
take drugs before working, and he had the ability to decide not to take them as well as the 
capacity to disclose his drug use to his employer. Denial about his addiction was thus 
irrelevant in this case. It cannot be assumed that Mr. Stewart’s addiction diminished his 
ability to comply with the terms of the Policy. In some cases, a person with an addiction 
may be fully capable of complying with workplace rules. In others, the addiction 
may efectively deprive a person of the capacity to comply, and the breach of the rule 
will be inextricably connected with the addiction. Many cases may exist somewhere 
between these two extremes. Whether a protected characteristic is a factor in the 
adverse impact will depend on the facts and must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. 
Te connection between an addiction and adverse treatment cannot be assumed and 
must be based on evidence … . 
Tus, while portions of the majority judgement in Stewart might be read 
as efectively treating an adverse discrimination case as one involving direct 
discrimination or improperly requiring an element of “intent,”85 we think the 
essence of the majority decision was that the facts of the case did not demonstrate 
that the employee was, as a result of his disability, without a meaningful choice 
as to whether to comply with the workplace obligations, on the facts as found 
82. Stewart v Elk Valley Coal Corp, 2017 SCC 30 [Stewart]. In the interest of disclosure, it should 
be noted that the authors’ law frm represented the respondent in the Stewart case. Te views 
expressed herein are solely those of the authors themselves. 
83. Ibid at para 22. 
84. Ibid at paras 38-39 [emphases added]. 
85. Ibid at paras 86-94, Gascon J, dissenting. 







by the Tribunal. Tat is not only, or even primarily, because the Tribunal found 
that his addiction was such that he could in fact control his drug use. Rather, 
it was because even if his addiction diminished his capacity to resist using drugs 
entirely, it did not preclude him from coming forward and disclosing his drug use 
under the circumstances, in order to obtain treatment and avoid placing others at 
risk. Assuming those facts to be established, the claimant was reasonably able to 
abide by the workplace rule or policy, and merely decided not to. 
In this way, the case of addiction provides a helpful illustration of the 
distinction between “problematic” and “necessary” use of choice situations. 
On the one hand, addiction is properly recognized as a disability, and to say 
that a person “chooses” to become addicted, and hence is disentitled to human 
rights code protection as a result, would be entirely improper, as it would defeat 
the entire purpose of the protection. In this respect, the “choices” leading to 
an addiction are irrelevant for the purposes of the application of the human 
rights codes. However, how or whether to treat, manage, address, or care for that 
addiction may, in particular contexts, be within the control of claimant. In that 
case, a decision to ignore reasonable treatment options, and hence create an 
unnecessary confict with workplace obligations, should not necessarily result in 
a fnding that the employer has discriminated. 
In the context of addictions especially, many choices made by a person who 
is an addict may or may not be within the “reasonable control” of a particular 
claimant, in light of their particular circumstances. Where the necessary degree 
of control is present with respect to a particular individual in relation to a 
particular choice—i.e., they were reasonably able to decide not to engage in the 
prohibited conduct—an act of discipline would not normally raise discriminatory 
implications, even if the illegal act is somehow superfcially “connected” to the 
addiction. By contrast, where the evidence with respect to the particular individual 
shows that he or she was not reasonably able to comply due to the efect of his or 
her disability, the prima facie stage will be made out. 
Tis approach is no diferent for “addiction-related misconduct” cases, 
which involve situations where it could be claimed that an addiction in some way 
contributed to a willingness or propensity to engage in that conduct, or make it 
more difcult for the individual to comply with workplace standards.86 Individuals 
may have various types of addictions, which drive them to engage in certain 
conduct, including drug use, smoking, accessing pornography, or gambling. 
However, that alone does not necessarily mean the individual is not reasonably 
86. See Ryan v Canada Safeway and Ramponi (No 2), 2008 BCHRT 12 (where LM Lyster noted, 
“[a]ny poor decision by a person sufering from a substance abuse problem could, in some 
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able to refrain from conduct that, while being related to their addition, negatively 
afects the workplace. Te question in all such cases is whether the claimant was 
not reasonably able, as result of the addiction (or any other disability), to meet 
the relevant standard, or instead, whether he or she had a meaningful choice in 
being able to meet it.87 
For instance, an addiction to smoking may prevent someone from avoiding 
smoking entirely, such that a requirement to refrain from smoking as a condition 
of employment, or even avoiding smoking entirely during a long shift, would 
constitute prima facie discrimination. However, the addiction does not prevent 
someone from taking reasonable steps to avoid harming other employees, such 
as going outside to have a cigarette, or avoiding smoking near fammable liquids. 
Again, as in the disability or alcohol addiction context, these scenarios present 
a superfcial factual connection between the adverse impact and the protected 
ground; an individual who is not addicted to nicotine will have an easier time not 
smoking near fammable liquids than an individual who is addicted. However, 
the mere existence of an addiction to nicotine does not establish that a rule 
against smoking cigarettes inside or near fammable liquids, or the imposition of 
discipline for breaking such rules, are prima facie discriminatory. Tat is because 
an addicted individual will normally be reasonably able to comply with the 
workplace-related rule, notwithstanding his or her addiction. It would trivialize 
human rights legislation to suggest that a prima facie case of discrimination is 
made out in response to a workplace rule prohibiting smoking indoors or near 
fammable liquids, on the bases that there is a “connection” between the conduct 
and the addiction, and that it will be (marginally) more difcult for individuals 
with an addiction to nicotine than for others. 
Tis analysis can apply to forms of disabilities outside of the addiction 
context as well. For instance, in Brekelmans, the arbitrator found that prima 
facie discrimination had not been made out, because the grievor had failed to 
establish a “causal nexus” between her tardiness and her various ailments.88 Tese 
included sleep apnea, depression, and a personality disorder, which she claimed 
87. See e.g. British Columbia (Public Service Agency) v British Columbia Government and Services 
Employees’ Union, 2008 BCCA 357. See also Bellehumeur v Windsor Factory Supply Ltd, 2015 
ONCA 473 at paras 3-4; BC Public Service Agency v BCGEU (Ramdharee Grievance), [2003] 
BCCAAA No 165 at para 41 (Arbitrator: KF Nordlinger); British Columbia v BCGEU 
(Demelt Grievance), [2001] BCCAAA No 373 at paras 34-38 (Arbitrator: KF Nordlinger); 
Durham Catholic District School Board v Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 218 
(Pantalleresco Grievance), [1998] OLAA No 664 (Arbitrator: RJ Roberts). 
88. British Columbia (Ministry of Housing and Social Development) v British Columbia 
Government and Services Employees Union (Brekelmans Grievance), [2010] BCCAAA No 86 at 
paras 59-69 (Arbitrator: Judi Korbin). 











contributed to her chronic inability to attend work on time. While there was no 
doubt that the grievor’s “various medical and personal circumstances make it a 
challenge for her” to correct her chronic inability to arrive to work on time, the 
arbitrator found that “it is a behavioural problem nonetheless and the griever’s 
[sic] medical conditions are not the cause of her tardiness in reporting for work.”89 
As such, despite the “connection between her ailments and her tardiness,” prima 
facie discrimination was not established because she was reasonably able to arrive 
at work on time.90 
Other similar scenarios can be imagined, in which an individual’s choices 
or preferences are the cause of a confict with workplace obligations, rather than 
their protected characteristics. For instance, a claimant with a back condition 
may have various ways to treat it, all of which are equally efective, but only some 
of which create a potential confict with workplace obligations. Te treatment 
options for this particular individual might include mood or capacity-altering 
medications, such as medical cannabis, which would impact the claimant’s 
ability to safely perform his or her job, as well as an equally efective and viable 
non-pharmaceutical treatment option that would not impact the claimant’s 
ability to safely perform his or her job. In this scenario, the claimant’s decision to 
treat his or her back condition with medical cannabis should not automatically 
lead to a conclusion that the employer has discriminated against the employee, 
because the individual had other reasonable options that would have completely 
avoided any confict with workplace obligations. Again, we would not normally 
call the expectation that employees attend work in an unimpaired state, if possible, 
an obligation on the employee to “self-accommodate” their disability. Rather, 
it is simply an aspect of determining whether any adverse impact is a result of a 
disability or a personal choice.91 
89. Ibid at para 68. 
90. See also Martin v Carter Chev Olds, 2001 BCHRT 37. In that case, the Tribunal cautioned 
employers against assuming that a disability necessarily impairs an employee’s ability to 
comply with workplace rules or standards. 
91. We acknowledge that some adjudicators may believe that an individual’s choice of medical 
treatment should be treated as a “problematic use” of choice situation, and hence irrelevant 
to the discrimination analysis. Tis issue will need to be carefully considered by future 
adjudicators and cannot be addressed in detail here. However, in our view, it is appropriate 
and consistent with the approach suggested here to consider alternative treatment options 
at the prima facie stage, at least in some circumstances, where there is reason to believe a 
particular treatment option creates a perfectly avoidable and unnecessary confict with a 
workplace obligation, and hence is more a product of individual choice rather than the 
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Tus, as with religion and family status cases, some disability cases raise the 
same type of “necessary use” of choice scenarios that are properly taken into 
account by adjudicators prior to fnding that prima facie discrimination is 
established sufcient to impose an obligation on an employer to accommodate 
to the point of undue hardship. Tis is the equivalent of the circumstances in 
family status cases. As Sheila Brown-Osborne illustrates the point:92 
It is not enough for an employee to simply state “I have a family status situation” to 
trigger the process of accommodation. Tis puts the ground of family status squarely 
on a par with other prohibited grounds. For example, not every disability-related 
need of an employee will cause them to seek accommodation. A physical condition 
may require medication that causes drowsiness, but if an employee can take the 
medication after their shift ends, they will not need accommodation. On the other 
hand, if their medication time falls within their shift, they may need a diferent shift 
or modifed job duties. Te same reasoning applies for family caregiving situations. 
A similar point was acknowledged in a recent Ontario arbitration 
ruling involving a disability claim. Te arbitrator in that case noted that 
“[n]otwithstanding the diferences between family status and disability, a claim 
that a commute discriminates against an employee and must be accommodated 
because of disability raises similar issues of employee choice,” providing the 
following example:93 
As a simple example of the impact of employee choice, suppose an employee with 
an injured leg will only travel to work on a bicycle and it is established that the 
distance the employee could travel by bicycle is limited to one kilometer because 
traveling any further than that by bicycle would cause further injury to their leg. If 
they claimed that they required accommodation in their commute by limiting their 
commute to one kilometer from home, how could that claim be assessed without 
taking into account the employee’s choice to only travel by bicycle? 
After quoting at length from the Misetich analysis in the family status context, the 
Arbitrator noted that in the above example, “unless some reason exists why the 
employee must travel by bicycle, the disadvantage caused by the commute is related 
entirely to the chosen mode of travel,” rather than the employee’s disability.94 
Tus, where a disadvantage or burden is the result of an employee’s choices, 
rather than their disability or addiction—for instance, the unreasonable choice to 
refuse medication or treatment, or the unreasonable choice to engage in prohibited 
92. Osborne-Brown, supra note 7 at 110. 
93. Ontario Secondary School Teachers’ Federation v Toronto District School Board (Grievance 13-50, 
Accommodation), [2020] OLAA No 24 at para 280 (Arbitrator: Jesse M Nyman). 
94. Ibid at para 285. 








conduct over which the individual has meaningful control—no obligation to 
accommodate arises. Te employee had the reasonable ability to comply with 
those workplace obligations, but simply chose not to. Terefore, as in family 
status cases, it is only when the employee is without the reasonable ability to 
fulfll their workplace obligations as a result of their protected characteristic that 
the duty to accommodate arises. 
IV.  CHALLENGES TO THE PROPOSED APPROACH 
As noted in the introduction, there are at least two fundamental challenges 
that could be ofered to the approach we suggest in this article: it improperly 
incorporates a notion of “choice” into the analysis, which should be avoided in the 
human rights code context; and it improperly imposes an additional burden on 
the claimant, efectively requiring them to “self-accommodate” at the prima facie
stage of the analysis. We address each potential objection in more detail below. 
A. MEANINGFUL CHOICE AND REASONABLE ABILITY 
As noted above, our use of the term “meaningful choice” in this context does 
not involve choice to have a particular family status—whether to be single or 
married, to live with a partner or cease to do so, to have children and how many, 
or similarly fundamentally personal life “choices.” While all of these may involve 
some element of agency or “choice,” they are properly treated as choices that 
do not factor into the human rights equation. Te statuses resulting from these 
types of “choices” are properly treated as constructively immutable characteristics 
that cannot provide a justifcation for unequal or disproportionate treatment. 
Simply put, they are so integrally connected to the protected characteristic or 
status itself that they form part of the identity regarding which human rights 
codes are intended to protect.95 
Indeed, much of the criticism of the use of the concept of “choice” 
in the context of human rights adjudication highlights these “problematic use” 
scenarios.96 Most commonly, adjudicators are criticized for treating the choice to 
95. Te most obvious example is discrimination on the basis of pregnancy, that, while often 
resulting from a choice to become pregnant or maintain a pregnancy, is nevertheless properly 
treated as a choice that does not impact the degree of protection or accommodation to which 
an individual is entitled. 
96. See e.g. Quebec (AG) v A, 2013 SCC 5 at paras 335-37 [Quebec v A] (where Justice Abella 
lists the types of “choices” that in our view are properly considered “of-limits” for the 
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marry as one that should disentitle individuals to a discrimination claim,97 and 
for framing the decision to become sexually intimate with a same sex partner as 
a “choice.”98 Relying on such choices as disentitling an individual to protection is 
entirely improper, as Justice Gascon explained in Stewart:99 
Likewise, a choice threshold generally contradicts this Court’s rejection—albeit in 
the context of other sections of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms—of 
drawing superfcial distinctions between protected grounds, like drug dependence 
or sexual orientation, and conduct inextricably linked to those grounds, like drug use or 
sexual activity (Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v. Whatcott, 2013 SCC 11 
… at paras. 121-24), a concern noted by the Tribunal here (para. 122). Further, it 
specifcally contradicts this Court’s rejection—albeit in the context of s. 7 of the 
Charter—of the view that “choice” makes drug users responsible for the harms of 
their drug use, rather than Charter-infringing laws or discriminatory employers. 
In our view, these criticisms of the use of the concept of “choice” are entirely 
correct, to the extent that the choice in question is inextricable from or otherwise 
fundamental to the protected ground.100 Tese types of “choices” should, in our 
view, be presumed at the outset of the analysis, given their close connection to the 
protected characteristic itself. By contrast, where the conduct in question is in a 
meaningful sense independent of the protected characteristic itself, consideration 
of those choices would not only be acceptable, but often necessary. 
In this way, the approach advanced here avoids the criticism that invoking 
the notion of “choice,” in any respect, will lead adjudicators to deny family status 
protection on the basis of the decision “to be a single parent, to have children 
(and how many), to use professional daycare instead of ad hoc arrangements with 
97. Most often criticized in this respect is Nova Scotia (AG) v Walsh, 2002 SCC 83 rev’g 
Quebec v A, supra note 95. See e.g. Lawrence, supra note 23 at 118-25; Majury, supra
note 23 at 220-26. 
98. See Trinity, supra note 24. 
99. See Stewart, supra note 82 at para 100. 
100. As noted above, we believe the essence of the dispute in Stewart was less about whether 
the individual in question had the choice to abstain from drugs entirely, and more about 
whether his use of drugs deprived him of the meaningful ability to refrain from attending 
work after using drugs or to obtain treatment, which was specifcally ofered as an option by 
the employer. Tus, while a drug addiction will often be inextricably tied to drug use, it does 
not automatically follow that drug addiction is inextricably tied to every decision in some 
way related that drug use that an individual may make. For instance, the decision to commit 
a violent act in order to obtain drugs, to use drugs in the restroom at work, to refrain from 
seeking treatment made available by the employer, or any other number of decisions factually 
linked to drug use, may remain in the control of particular claimants, even if their ability to 
refrain entirely from using drugs is signifcantly diminished as a result of the addiction. 













family, friends, and neighbours.”101 All of these choices, in our view, are the types 
that are fundamental to the protected characteristic itself and should remain 
immune from scrutiny, in the same way as the supposed “choice” to follow one’s 
religion or engage in sexual intimacy with a partner of ones choosing is efectively 
no choice at all.102 
However, just as certain types of choices are relevant to whether a prima 
facie case of discrimination is established in the context of disability, addiction, 
and religion cases, the choice of how to deal with the inevitable conficts that 
can arise between workplace and family life, which are ubiquitous and factually 
complex, cannot be necessarily immune from consideration in this context. 
Indeed, as suggested above, our view is that a consideration of these types of 
choices have permeated the diferent approaches to prima facie discrimination 
in the family status accommodations ofered to-date. Tat is because, unlike in 
101. Shilton, “Work–Family Divide,” supra note 23 at 55. Careful readers will notice that of 
Professor Shilton’s list, we have left out the choices “to refuse the nanny option” and “to 
live in a small town rather than a big city.” With respect to the frst type of choice, it is not 
clear to us why this should be categorically of the table, in the same way as other decisions 
that are more fundamental to the family status itself. In other words, most parents may well 
prefer to avoid the “nanny option,” but may have jobs that require them to be at work. If the 
“nanny option” or other daycare options are reasonably available, albeit perhaps not the ideal 
arrangement from the parents’ perspective, it is not clear to us why the employer should 
necessarily be required to accommodate that preference. By contrast, where a professional 
daycare option is not reasonable or feasible in the context of the particular claimant, then a 
prima facie case would be made out. For instance, some employees may hypothetically be 
able to aford day care, but may live in areas where, with reasonable diligence, such care is 
not available, in which case the claimant will not have had the “reasonable ability” to fulfll 
both workplace and family obligations. With respect to the second type of choice relating to 
where to live, we suggest that this consideration is at least not obviously a “problematic use” 
of choice. For instance, if living in a “small town” makes it so that a claimant is unable to 
attend work regularly, or at all, because the small town is hundreds of kilometers away from 
the city-based employment opportunity, it is not obvious to us that the choice to live so far 
away from work would or should constitute a prima facie case of discrimination. 
102. Tis may or may not apply to the choice between using professional day care as opposed 
to family and friends for childcare. Tat is, assuming both options are reasonably available 
and equally capable of resulting in the level of necessary care, it should not matter to the 
employer which option is chosen. However, if the employee’s decision is to, for instance, 
use available family members instead of day care in a way that creates a workplace confict 
(that would be avoided by the alternative and reasonably available decision), such a decision 
may be questioned to see whether it was the only reasonable option available under the 
circumstances, and hence whether the employee actually required accommodation or 










VIPOND, OLIPHANT, FAMILY STATUS DISCRIMINATION 599 
other contexts,103 there is a meaningful distinction between an individual’s family 
status and the various shifting and variable obligations or activities that may be 
more or less associated with or dictated by that status. 
Moreover, at least some accounting for the reasonable options available 
to an employee would seem to be clearly unavoidable. To modify an example 
used above, an employee may have numerous options available in terms of 
arranging a doctor’s appointment for a child, including one appointment time 
that conficts with workplace obligations and another that does not. Should the 
employee choose the arrangement that unnecessarily conficts with workplace 
obligations, it seems wrong to describe the avoidable confict with workplace 
obligations as amounting to “discrimination” on the employer’s part, and to place 
a legal obligation on the employer to accommodate that employee’s choice.104 
Indeed, to take the hypothetical a step further, imagine that the employee did 
not schedule the doctor’s appointment during of hours, because the only other 
available time for the appointment conficted with the employee’s plan to attend 
a movie. In that case, the employer is not being asked to accommodate the 
individual’s family status at all—they are being required, as a legal imperative 
under the human rights code, to accommodate an employee’s desire to attend a 
movie at a particular time. Clearly, that alone is insufcient to establish a prima 
facie case of discrimination. 
However, the conclusion that such scenarios constitute prima facie 
discrimination, sufcient to shift an obligation to accommodate onto the 
employer, would be the necessary consequence of an approach in which a 
consideration of an employee’s choices or decisions were irrelevant to the 
prima facie case. In that case, any workplace and family confict, no matter 
how avoidable or how directly it is tied to a voluntary choice on the part of a 
103. For instance, it is properly acknowledged that the distinction between sexual orientation 
and engaging in same-sex intimacy is often legally irrelevant, as “certain practices cannot 
be separated from identity, such that condemnation of the practice is a condemnation of 
the person.” See Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v Whatcott, 2013 SCC 11 at 
para 123. By contrast, the choice to have children can often be meaningfully separated 
from the choice of how to address childcare obligations, even if, in light of a particular 
individual’s circumstances, there was no reasonable choice available to them that would have 
avoided a confict between workplace and family obligations, and therefore a prima facie
case is made out. 
104. Of course, this is subject to any other facts that might make the alternative choice 
unreasonable. For instance, if the choice was made to schedule the appointment during work 
hours because there was an emergency or a risk to the health of the child if the appointment 
was delayed, that would obviously not leave the employee with a reasonable choice to fulfll 
both family and workplace obligations. 










claimant rather than an individual’s family status, results in a fnding of prima 
facie discrimination. It is for this reason that adjudicators have found that it is 
appropriate to take certain types of “choices” into account in this context, as long 
as the analysis is suitably fexible and responsive to the real life circumstances of 
individuals and the challenges they face. 
Tus, while adjudicators should continue to treat as irrelevant the supposed 
“choices” that lead to a particular family status—i.e., the choice to marry or 
divorce, the choice to have one child or three, the choice to share custody, and 
so on—they should not completely ignore more everyday choices connected to 
family obligations that directly impact whether an employee is or is not able to 
fulfll workplace obligations. If the reader will excuse an unfortunate pun, it is not 
necessary to throw the baby out with the bathwater, and render every decision 
made by an employee irrelevant to the analysis. It may not always be easy to tell 
on what side of the line a particular case falls, but that does not mean that there 
is no line at all. Human rights adjudicators are normally adept at understanding 
and identifying the circumstances of claimants, and what constitutes a reasonable 
ability to fulfll a workplace condition in a manner that is sensitive to those 
particular circumstances and the overall purposes of the human rights codes. Te 
standard we propose would allow them to do so. 
In this way, our proposed analysis does not result in a “decontextualized 
invocation of choice that looks at a specifc choice in a vacuum and fails to examine 
the limits on available alternative constraints on the chooser.”105 To the contrary, 
focusing on the reasonable opportunities or options available to an employee to 
avoid a confict between work and family life is a valuable tool in this context, 
precisely because it can account for the unique circumstances of each individual. 
It not only permits, but expressly requires, a consideration of “the limits on 
available alternative constraints on the chooser,”106 in order to determine whether 
the employee faces circumstances that properly require accommodation under 
the human rights codes. While adjudicators should not presume the presence of 
a choice where no reasonable choice exists, they should also not blind themselves 
to circumstances where a workplace confict is primarily the product of a choice 
or preference of an employee, rather than that employee’s family status. 
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B. “SOMETHING MORE” 
Many authors—including one of the authors of this article107—have in the past 
criticized courts and tribunals for imposing an additional burden on a claimant 
at the prima facie stage, mirroring the standard often applied in the context of 
Charter claims.108 Tis “something more” often includes requiring a claimant to 
establish, in addition to adverse treatment based on a protected characteristic, 
some normative “wrong” at the prima facie stage, whether it be in terms of 
stereotyping, prejudice, or arbitrariness. Our view is that such considerations are 
generally irrelevant at the prima facie stage and are better dealt with (if at all) in 
the context of the duty to accommodate analysis. 
However, as we have sought to identify above, there are certain circumstances 
that raise diferent considerations. Where the adverse impact is not imposed by 
the rule or obligation itself as a necessary consequence of the family status, but 
rather as a result of a voluntary decision of the claimant that puts an individual’s 
circumstances in confict with the rule, it is not obvious why this should be 
treated as prima facie discriminatory or leading to an obligation to accommodate 
that decision to the point of undue hardship. Where an employee is presented 
with a meaningful range of options, and they chose the option that creates a 
workplace confict instead of an equally reasonable option that avoids it, the 
adverse treatment is more a result of that free choice, rather than something 
fowing directly from the family status itself. 
To this extent, it is not reasonably possible to completely avoid any sort 
of normative analysis at the prima facie stage of the analysis in the context of 
situations where, as in the context of family status claims, there are necessarily 
elements of choice mixed in with the family status. As Brown-Osborne points 
out, “family status cases inevitably raise the thorny issue of choice versus 
obligation.”109 As such, there must be some basis upon which to determine which 
factor is the dominant cause of the adverse impact: a choice or preference that 
creates a reasonably avoidable confict, or the absence of such a choice and hence 
107. See Benjamin Oliphant, “Prima Facie Discrimination: Is Tranchemontagne Consistent 
with the Supreme Court of Canada’s Human Rights Code Jurisprudence?” (2012) 9 
JL & Equality 33. 
108. See e.g. Denise Réaume, “Defending the Human Rights Codes from the Charter” (2012) 
9 JL & Equality 67 at 80-87. See also the survey of literature in A Wayne MacKay, “Te 
Marriage of Human Rights Codes and Section 15 of the Charter in Pursuit of Equality: 
A Case for Greater Separation in Both Teory and Practice” (2013) 64 UNBLJ 54; Bruce 
Ryder, “Te Strange Double Life of Canadian Equality Rights” (2013) 63 SCLR (2d) 261. 
109. Osborne-Brown, supra note 7 at 90. 








the family status itself. Tis will necessarily require recourse to some normative 
judgments in relation to the reasonableness of the options available to an 
employee to avoid the confict. 
If a reasonable ability or reasonable choice standard were adopted, as proposed 
in this article, there are at least two types of situations in which adjudicators will 
have to rely on a normative judgment. First, they must decide what types of 
choices fall into the “problematic use of choice” category, such that they should 
be presupposed as integral to the family status itself, and therefore irrelevant 
to both the prima facie and Meiorin analyses. Second, even where the choice 
in question is not so fundamentally connected with the family status itself so 
as to be beyond scrutiny, adjudicators will still have to determine whether an 
employee was reasonably able to fulfll both workplace and family obligations, 
on the basis that they had reasonable alternative options available to them to 
avoid the confict. Both of these judgments may be difcult in certain cases and 
may result in reasonable disagreement. 
As an example of the frst type of question, take the controversial case of the 
“choice” to breastfeed a child.110 On our approach, the threshold question in these 
cases is whether the decision to breastfeed or not is a mere family “preference,” 
or rather is the type of fundamental choice in relation to family status that should 
be immune from consideration, such as the “choice” of whether to have children 
at all. To make this determination, an adjudicator must initially decide whether 
it is reasonable to put an employee to the choice of either breastfeeding her child, 
or fulflling workplace requirements by, for instance, using a breast pump and 
bottle outside of work hours. Te answer to this question is not self-evident, and 
ultimately will depend on the enlightened and careful reasoning of adjudicators, 
informed by the overall purposes of the human rights codes. 
However, it is our view that this is the type of personal or fundamental 
parenting decision that should be treated as part and parcel of an individual’s 
family status. Tat is because the decision is so fundamental to the relationship 
between a mother and child that a workplace obligation necessarily impeding 
that decision should be treated as prima facie discriminatory, and properly 
subject to a Meiorin analysis. Importantly, this does not preclude an assessment 
of whether a particular workplace rule, policy or decision necessarily conficts with 
an employee’s ability to breastfeed her child. It merely suggests that where there 
110. Tis issue has arisen in cases like Flatt FCA, supra note 8 at para 35 (which involved a 
claimant requesting to work from home in order to continue to breastfeed her child). In that 
case, the Federal Court of Appeal held that “[b]reastfeeding during working hours is not a 
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is such a necessary and reasonably unavoidable confict, an employee should not 
be disentitled from protection on the basis of the “choice” to breastfeed her child, 
any more than the decision of whether to have a child in the frst place. 
Moreover, even leaving aside the types of “problematic uses” of the concept 
of choice, there will still be the question of whether an employee was reasonably 
able to fulfll both workplace and family obligations. Tis can raise a number of 
difcult issues and will require judgment as to whether the alternatives available 
to an employee to avoid the confict were really reasonable alternatives in the 
claimant’s particular context. It may require, as in the SMS Equipment case, 
an assessment of whether the alternative options are truly “viable” in the context 
of a particular case. Fortunately, as outlined above, this has almost always been 
the heart of the issue in the family status jurisprudence to date, which should 
provide at least some guidance. 
Terefore, we do not dispute that the prima facie analysis we propose, at least 
for the most difcult cases, requires a lot of work by the application of normative 
terms like “reasonable” and “meaningful.” It will not always be easy or obvious 
whether a particular factual circumstance presents an employee with reasonable 
alternative options or unreasonable ones. As Professor Shilton points out, the 
distinction between a meaningful choice and an obligation will “often be far from 
clear.”111 We agree, and do not suggest that our approach will easily resolve all 
difcult cases, or that it can completely eliminate any type of normative judgment 
at the prima facie stage of the analysis. 
Rather, the purpose of the standard we propose is to identify the crux of 
the dispute in these cases, in a manner consistent with the vast majority of 
adjudicative approaches to date. It is to focus the analysis on where it matters— 
whether or not a reasonable or meaningful option exists that would allow an 
employee to fulfll both family and workplace obligations, such that it cannot 
be said that their family status led to any non-trivial workplace disadvantage. 
Although this standard does not create a bright line distinction, in our view, 
that is a good thing in this context: our approach leaves room for growth and 
reasonable disagreement, without either adopting a standard that either places 
too high a burden on the complainant, or one that seems to presume every 
assertion that an individual has a family obligation that conficts with a workplace 
obligation necessarily constitutes prima facie discrimination. 
111. Shilton, “Work–Family Divide,” supra note 23 at 54. 
















Te confusion and concern raised by some adjudicators and scholars regarding 
the various approaches to establishing prima facie discrimination in family status 
cases (e.g., the Hoyt test, the Campbell River test, and the Johnstone test) is, in our 
respectful view, misplaced. Te deep commonality among these approaches 
is their attempt to identify a principled point at which it can be said that the 
prima facie case is made out. Te leading tests in this area consistently hold 
that there must be more than an asserted confict with family-related activities, 
duties or obligations in order to show that family status is a “factor” in any related 
adverse treatment. In deciding where to draw the line, they all revolve around an 
employee’s “meaningful choice” or “reasonable ability” to avoid a confict, such 
that the claimant must be able to show that he or she does not have meaningful or 
reasonable options that would avoid the confict between workplace and family 
obligations. In our view, that is when an impact on family-related obligations or 
activities constitutes an adverse impact on the basis of family status. 
In addition, as we have tried to demonstrate, these various approaches 
do not necessarily place a higher burden on claimants to establish prima facie
discrimination compared with other protected grounds of discrimination. To the 
contrary, they are consistent with a range of other types of cases—particularly 
in the context of disability, addiction, and religion—where there is an element 
of personal choice that can complicate the assumption that any superfcial 
factual connection between the protected characteristic and adverse treatment is 
sufcient to constitute a prima facie case of discrimination. 
Ultimately, and with respect, we suggest that the sometimes-heated debate 
between proponents of various “tests” in the family status context are often 
more rhetorical than substantive. By and large, adjudicators generally agree on 
the factors that are relevant to establish a prima facie case in this context. Most 
fundamentally, they appear to agree that it matters whether there is an actual 
need for accommodation, which we suggest will arise as a result of the absence 
of reasonable alternatives that would avoid the confict entirely. We have tried 
to identify and highlight this underlying consensus and to propose a theoretical 
framework within which it can be best understood, which is through the lens of 
the concepts of “meaningful choice” or “reasonable ability” to avoid the confict 
entirely. Tis general formulation still leaves many questions in specifc cases 
unanswered, but in our view, it provides a principled starting point, consistent 
with the available approaches to family status discrimination and human rights 
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VI. POSTSCRIPT: FRASER V. CANADA (ATTORNEY GENERAL) 
After completion of this paper, but before publication, the Supreme Court 
released its decision in Fraser, addressing whether the pension consequences of 
a particular job sharing arrangement violated section ffteen of the Charter.112 
While space does not permit a comprehensive analysis of the decision, we note 
that the “choice” at issue in Fraser was characterized as one that “often lies beyond 
the individual’s efective control,” amounting to “a ‘choice’ between either 
staying above or below the poverty line.”113 Tese are precisely the circumstances 
in which, we have suggested, a claimant has no “meaningful choice” at all. 
In our view, while Fraser highlighted the “faws of over-emphasizing choice in 
the s. 15 inquiry,”114 it does not suggest that choice can never be relevant to the 
discrimination analysis. Rather, it constitutes a reminder that it is a consideration 
that should be carefully examined and scrutinized, a position we share and have 
attempted to defend in this paper. 
112. Fraser v Canada (Attorney General), 2020 SCC 28. 
113. Ibid at para 91. 
114. Ibid at paras 86-91 [emphasis added]. 
